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RATIONALIZING REGULATORY REFORM 
Emest Gellhom * 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM. By Stephen Breyer. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1982. Pp. xii, 472. $25. 
Regulatory reform has long been a standard campaign refrain among 
America's political leaders. Beneficiaries of government largess generally 
believe themselves entitled to more; those denied government protection are 
even more readily dissatisfied. Thus, getting government "off the people's 
back" may have proven to be a particularly effective way to identify with 
popular concern over ineffective, inefficient, and intrusive regulation, but it 
was not a new or unusual insight. 
On the other hand, knowing what we as a people want and deciding 
what we do not like is very different from achieving regulatory reform. In-
deed, even determining what is meant by regulatory reform remains unset-
tled and is seldom examined. For example, reformers have approached 
regulatory problems in recent times from several different directions. Some 
have focused on the Congress, urging more specific legislative direction and 
less delegation to the agencies, closer control through intensified committee 
oversight, and final review of regulations by devices such as the one-house 
legislative veto. 1 Others have looked directly at the regulatory programs 
themselves and challenged their validity, urging total or partial deregula-
tion - as in the case of the Civil Aeronautics Board controls on airlines or 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of railroads and trucks - or 
proposing generic sunset laws that would allow regulatory programs to 
lapse unless specifically renewed.2 
Despite evidence that intensified congressional oversight can redirect 
misguided agency programs (as was the case with the Federal Trade Com-
mission) or that specific deregulation can lower costs and increase efficiency 
(as with airlines), most of the attention has concentrated on a third ap-
proach to regulatory reform, namely improving the operation of agencies 
by changing internal procedures or external judicial or presidential review.3 
* Dean and Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. - Ed. 
1. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, II CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF 
REGULATORY AGENCIES, s. Doc. No. 26, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-111 (1977) (illustrating 
weakness of congressional oversight); T. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-107 (2d ed. 1979) 
( criticizing permissive delegation of legislative power); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Con-
trol of Adminsitrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HAR.v. L. REv. 1369 (1977) 
(reviewing impact of legislative veto on agencies). 
2. See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95- 504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified 
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1729, (Supp. IV 1980)); Note, Sunset Legislation: Spotlighting Bureau-
cracy, 11 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 269 (1978). 
3. See, e.g., S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S2713 (1982) (This bill, the 
"Regulatory Reform Act," was passed by the Senate 94-0 on March 24, 1982); Verkuil, The 
Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258 (1978); Exec. Order 
No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. V 1981). 
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These proposals assume that regulation is necessary and desirable and that 
the problem is one of people, organization, and decisionmaking processes. 
Stephen Breyer's new book, outlining the causes of "regulatory failure" 
and proposing a framework for matching regulatory cures more closely to 
unregulated diseases, thus is particularly timely. As he explains it, the in-
adequacies of legislative oversight and direction or agency personnel and 
procedures are not the primary causes of the current regulatory malaise; 
consequently, they are not the proper target for reform. For example, more 
precise direction from Congress to the Federal Power Commission would 
not have solved the problems of natural gas supply caused by maximum 
price controls and government allocations.4 Similarly, it is not reasonable 
to expect that rules barring ex parte contracts5 or decisions opening up the 
administrative process to greater public participation6 would assure that 
regulators reached correct results. Requiring Federal Communication 
Commission decisionmakers to listen to additional voices cannot improve 
on the present system of allocating broadcast licenses - or at least on a free 
market system - where assignments are not informed by any standard. 
Breyer's numerous contributions on these and other related lines are sub-
stantial. Among the best is his comprehensive classification of the substan-
tive bases of administrative regulation.7 He supplies a sophisticated 
framework for rethinking regulatory designs and programs. Whether 
Breyer has, in fact, always derived effective rules for regulatory reform and 
identified viable solutions for regulatory failure is, it seems to me, less 
certain. 
Breyer's text has three parts. In the first he examines eight justifications 
for regulation,8 six categories of "classical" regulation,9 and seven altema-
4. Imposing maximum prices below market-clearing levels discourages innovation and 
production, stimulates demand, and misallocates resources to other than their most highly 
valued uses. Because of powerful incentives to "cheat," such controls must be enforced with 
substantial penalties. In addition, since demand will exceed supply at controlled prices, some 
mechanism for allocation is necessary. Without the availability of price as the method for 
selection, nonmarket measures such as prior users, priority users based on political factors or 
similar standards must be developed and applied in deciding who can purchase the below-
market-priced goods and services. Not surprisingly, the administrative process has not proved 
equal to the task of replacing the market for making such decisions. Inevitably, administra-
tively imposed price controls fail to allocate resources efficiently, protect against windfalls, or 
deal fairly with users. See generally Jones, Government Price Controls and Inflation: A Progno• 
sis Based on the Impact of Controls in the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 303 
(1980). 
5. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). See also Gellhom & Robinson, Rulemaking ".Due Process'~· An 
Inconclusive .Dialogue, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 201, 237-58 (1981). 
6. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.). See generally Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative 
Proceedings, 81 YALE LJ. 359 (1972). 
7. See also Breyer,Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, 
and Reform, 92 HAR.v. L. REv. 547 (1979). This effort to organize our understanding of the 
rationale and modes of regulation as well as the less restrictive alternatives has also proved 
highly useful in introducing students to administrative regulation and administrative law doc-
trines. See s. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 
(1979) (reviewed by Gellhorn, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1384 (1980)). 
8. The justifications for administrative regulation are summarized as control of monopoly 
power, limitation of windfall profits, compensation for "spillovers" or "externalities," correc-
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tives in which all but one are "less restrictive."10 This complex taxonomy 
seeks to impose order on a field that has developed over almost one hun-
dred years without devoting sufficient attention to the causes of market fail-
ure or to whether regulatory solutions are in fact designed to solve market 
problems. To the economist familiar with the application of price theory to 
government regulation, this discussion is neither new nor startling. For 
nonacademic lawyers and other policy makers, however, it is likely to be an 
eye-opening experience; only occasionally has rigorous economic analysis 
penetrated legislative halls or regulatory bureaucracies. 
A major strength of Breyer' s book, then, in addition to its uncommonly 
crisp style and selective use of particularly instructive examples, is its acces-
sibility to the noneconomist seriously interested in studying regulatory re-
form without first becoming skilled in econometric techniques or regression 
analysis. Another impressive feature is Breyer's discontent with simply fol-
lowing standard economic formats in describing regulation. His coherent 
and systematic coverage of all forms of economic and social regulation pro-
vides a picture of the entire field - a prerequisite to any rational trimming. 
Administrative regulation may result in numerous complaints, but it did 
not arise unwanted and is not without its beneficiaries and supporters. In-
deed, its critics generally only want to improve it. Here, however, Breyer 
parts company with traditional regulatory reformers, for he argues that re-
form must proceed ''with an eye toward radical substantive change" (p. 
191). 
This sets the stage for Part Il's further development of the book's central 
message, that the failure of regulation is due to a basic failure in the system 
- the "mismatch" between the perceived market defect and the govern-
mental response (p. 191). Breyer supports this conclusion with five illustra-
tions drawn from the regulation of airlines, trucking, natural gas, pollution, 
and telecommunications. He is most effective in describing where past reg-
ulatory schemes have gone wrong. Returning, for example, to the story of 
natural gas, he outlines in brief compass the evolution and demise of natu-
ral gas regulation (pp. 241-60).11 As Breyer explains it, the Federal Power 
Commission's regulation failed because it could not solve the problem of 
joint costs (between gas and oil), differing historical costs (of natural gas 
offered to competing buyers), and uncertain future energy demands (in 
making allocation decisions). He carefully notes, however, that these par-
ticular problems were not caused by any failure peculiar to the FPC, and 
that attempts to rewrite its authority, appoint better people, improve proce-
dures, etc., would have had no effect. It is simply that government interven-
tion of information inadequacy, avoidance of "excessive competition," rationalization of ineffi-
cient production, constraints on "moral hazards," and paternalism. Pp. 15-34. 
9. The traditional methods of regulation examined are cost of service ratemaking, histori-
cally based price regulation, allocation under a "public interest" standard, standard setting, 
historically based allocation, and individualized screening. Pp. 36-155. 
10. The alternative nomegulatory responses to market failure are antitrust laws, disclosure 
requirements, taxes, marketable property rights, changes in tort liability, bargaining, and na-
tionalization. The latter is, of course, more restrictive. Pp. 156-83. • 
11. Sees. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COM-
MISSION 16-88 (1974). 
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tion is unlikely to improve on market decisions where competition among 
energy sources is available. 
A virtue of Breyer's study is that he makes his case from a variety of 
examples. He is equally familiar with numerous forms of economic and 
social regulation and demonstrates that each situation must be reviewed in 
context. When so evaluated, he concludes, airlines and trucking regulation 
also cannot be justified, current pollution regulation is at least a partial mis-
match, and local telephone service is a natural monopoly requiring some 
form of traditional regulation. 
Powerful as this demonstration is, it is in his description of the processes 
and problems of regulatory reform - in Part III of the book - that Breyer 
provides some of his most useful insights. Drawing on his experiences as 
staff director of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure to illustrate his points, he shows some of the precondi-
tions to successful regulatory reform. His focus is on (1) a sound theoretical 
understanding of the failure of regulation; (2) empirical evidence support-
ing the theoretical case; (3) creation of a political awareness of the costs of 
regulatory mismatch; and (4) preparation of a concrete alternative. In fact, 
I read his analysis as also suggesting at least two more: (5) leadership by 
the agency and in Congress as well as in the White House to force the issue 
on the public agenda; and (6) timing (including a healthy economy). The 
last is particularly important in light of the benefits regulation confers on a 
few who will struggle to retain their preferred position - an argument 
often buttressed in hard economic times by additional equitable claims. On 
the other hand, Breyer's discussion also wisely recognizes that in political 
contests there are no roadmaps, so reliance on past approaches is a bit like 
driving by looking only in the rear view mirror. 
Recognizing the towering strengths of the Breyer text, however, should 
not blind us to some of its limitations. It admittedly looks only to the 'Jus-
tifications for regulation, not causes" (p. 9). Thus, the author disregards the 
increasingly important literature in economics, political science, and law 
that has provocatively explored with insight and sensitivity the possible 
causes of regulation.12 Contrary to the implications of the Breyer mono-
graph, these studies suggest that regulation is often the result of the collec-
tive production of private goods and that it is the regulated parties who, in 
fact, have sought and obtained government protection from the chilly winds 
of competition. These studies, therefore, not only strengthen Breyer's argu-
ment but also have substantial implications for his analysis of regulatory 
reform. Reform is, as he acknowledges, as much a practical political exer-
cise as it is an intellectual effort. 
Thus it is curious and disappointing that Breyer does not carefully re-
view this literature or its .findings. Moreover, he is unpersuasive in contend-
ing that only justifications, rather than causes, need be examined because 
legislators, administrators and judges will be swayed by "arguments on the 
12. See, e.g., Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 
(1971); Posner, Tlz,eories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); B. 
MITNICK, THE PoLmCAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION (1980). Some implications of this "pub-
lic choice" analysis for administrative law doctrine are suggested and discussed in Aranson, 
Gellhom & Robinson,A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982). 
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merits." To be sure, policy rationales are critical to the case for regulatory 
reform. But the reform of regulation also requires that we fully understand 
its origins, foundations, functions, and support structure. This does not 
deny the necessity of showing that, because truckers face competition from 
alternative means of transport, trucking regulation cannot be justified as a 
control of natural monopoly. On the other hand, as Breyer himself demon-
strates, a pragmatic proposal for reform is more likely to secure support if, 
borrowing from airline deregulation, it includes protection for small com-
munities or transitional assistance for truckers who previously were the 
beneficiaries (and possibly the initiators) of that regulation. In other words, 
if we are to neutralize and overcome the pressures for protection and ad-
ministrative regulation, we need all available guidance. 13 Thus, I fear that 
Breyer' s undue emphasis on market-failure justifications for regulation re-
flects a misunderstanding of real-world forces. Moreover, if his analysis is 
relied on exclusively by regulatory reformers, it may mislead them into be-
lieving that rational analysis rather than practical political power, bar-
gained for trade-offs, etc., will probably determine whether deregulation 
can succeed. 
Another limitation of this book is its partial and often selective use of 
price theory to challenge economic and social regulation. Although Breyer 
recognizes what Frank Easterbrook calls the ''nirvana fallacy'' 14 - the be-
lief that once an imperfect state of affairs is discovered, any regulatory 
change is necessarily an improvement - too often he urges milder inter-
vention as a solution when its only justification is that alternative forms of 
regulation are less effective and efficient. The critical question to be asked 
in examining regulatory regimes and considering their reform is: "As com-
pared to what?" Breyer sometimes does not consider that in some of these 
circumstances, no regulation may be preferred; inaction may be less ineffi-
cient than even the least intrusive regulatory proposal. For example, in 
favoring information and taxes to classic command-and-control regulation, 
he does not carefully examine the evidence that the use of information or 
labeling controls or taxes to eliminate rents might lead to equally undesir-
able or even worse results. Studies of drug regulation (cited by Breyer) 
make the point (e.g. , p. 423 n.24). For example, Peltzman and others have 
shown that premarket testing and clearance may cost consumers more in 
terms of the benefits of innovation and drug market than it saves.15 Breyer, 
on the other hand, suggests that information and disclosure may, in similar 
instances, be preferable (p. 155). Before accepting his recommendation, 
however, decisionmakers must weigh the benefits against the potential costs 
of information/disclosure regulation. It is here that Breyer's summary of 
the literature is less than complete for he focuses primarily on the reform of 
regulation rather than its elimination, which may in fact be the most needed 
13. See generally DEREGULATING AMERICAN INDUSTRY: LEGAL & EcONOMIC PROBLEMS 
(D. Martin & W. Schwartz eds. 1977); Gaskin & Voytko, Managing the Transition to Deregula-
tion, 44 LAW & CoNTEMP. PR.OBS. 9 (1981); Kahn.Application of Economics to an Impeifect 
World, AM. EcoN. A. PAPERS & PRoc., 91ST ANN. MTG. 1 (1979); Quinn & Trebilock, Com-
pensating Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change, 32 U. TORONTO LJ. 117 (1982). 
14. Easterbrook, Breaking Up is Hard To Do, REGULATION, Nov.- Dec. 1981, at 25, 26. 
15. See, e.g., Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug 
.Amendments, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 1049 (1973). 
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reform.16 
This leads him, and I think unwisely, to support a variety of other ge-
neric solutions, including a somewhat dramatic but unlikely device called a 
"high noon" proposal for regulatory reform (p. 366). Under the version 
Breyer drafted for Senator 'Kennedy, presidential commissions would study 
specified regulatory programs in accordance with a prescribed schedule, 
and Congress would be required to vote on the commission's proposals. 
The purpose of this plan is to overcome legislative inertia and force sub-
stantive regulatory reform on the lawmaker's docket. 
Perhaps, little would be lost in experimenting with this suggestion. Cer-
tainly the time deadline in the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act17 has kept 
decontrol of the airlines on schedule. But the cases are different and this 
proposal ignores the causes of regulation elsewhere disregarded by Breyer's 
analysis. Conceivably, there are situations where the coalition supporting 
regulation is so fragile and the effects of regulation are so marginal that 
such procedural mechanisms (one is tempted to say, gimmicks) can tip the 
scales in favor of regulatory reform, but it seems unlikely. The experience 
in the states with a similar idea, the "sunset" mechanism whereby regula-
tory bodies have a limited lifespan unless specifically reauthorized, how-
ever, suggests that most economic and social regulation is much sturdier 
than these agenda-forcing proposals assume, 18 and its survival among regu-
lators and their supporters cannot be readily upset except by the kind of 
analysis and strategy generally outlined in Judge Breyer's book. 
* * * * * * 
_ Stephen Breyer was one of the principal architects of the decontrol of 
airline regulation along with Alfred Kahn, 19 John Robson,20 Edward Ken-
nedy,21 James Miller,22 Michael Levine,23 and numerous others. Several, 
16. Compare s. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161-64 (1982), with Jarrell, The 
Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Markel for New Security Issues, 24 J. LAW & 
EcoN. 613 (1981) and Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Ieformation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979). 
17. See note 2supra. 
18. See, e.g., Behn, The False Dawn of the Sunset Laws, 49 THE PuBLIC INTEREST 103 
(1977). 
19. Now a professor of economics at Cornell University, Kahn was the chairman of the 
CAB during the early years of the Carter administration and a principal leader in the deregu-
lation of the airline industry. 
20. Professor Kahn's predecessor as chairman of the CAB, Robson initiated the agency's 
efforts at administrative deregulation and had a significant impact in changing the direction of 
the bureaucracy's thinking. 
21. Senator Kennedy was the principal leader in Congress' passage of legislation to de-
regulate airlines. He used his position as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure to hold hearings in 1975 to educate the public on the 
costs of regulation and the likely benefits of deregulation. The hearings and committee report 
(written primarily by Professor Breyer) were instrumental in creating the political forces that 
resulted in the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act. See SUBCOM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., !ST SESS., CIVIL AERO-
NAUTICS BOARD PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES (Comm. Print 1975). 
22. G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: 
THEORY AND POLICY (1974). 
23. Levine was a law professor at Southern California, then an aide to Chairman Kahn at 
the CAB and now President of New York Air, one of the new entries favored by deregulation. 
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such as Michael Levine, have gone on to try to show that airlines can com-
pete and survive - and serve the consumer better - in an unregulated 
environment, even during times of economic stress and change. Others, in-
cluding such disparate partners as James Miller (as chairman of the FTC) 
and Edward Kennedy (as one of the proponents of trucking reform) have 
turned their attention to different fields where regulatory reform has had 
greater difficulty taking hold. 
Breyer's approach, however, has been unique. As a chronicler of the 
intellectual and practical forces behind airline deregulation, he has sought 
·to instruct us not only in the particulars of that case, but also in the lessons 
that can be drawn and in their application elsewhere. In light of his success 
and the thoughtfulness and comprehensiveness of his structure and strat-
egy, I have little doubt that his views should be heeded and his recommen-
dations tried. 
Thus, whatever criticisms or differences I or others might offer to 
Breyer's text, they pale by comparison to his contribution. He has deep-
ened our understanding of the forces that fuel the regulatory engines and 
shown how they might be harnessed. In the process, he has also pieced 
together a puzzle that has often confounded us. One only wishes that there 
were some way to "command and control" both regulators and legislators 
to read his book and accept his advice. 
His works include Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline .Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 
L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 179 (1981); Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? Cal!famia Air Trans-
portation and National Regulatory Policy, 14 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965) (written by Levine). 
